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VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF HEALTH PLANS
FOR MEDICAL INJURIES
Richard A. Epstein*
Thank you Guido for that kind introduction, which shows that you
have not forgotten my Yale credentials. But there is room, I think, for at
least, this bit of correction of my personal historical record. The most
powerful influences on me first came with my Oxford education. It may
have been happenstance that I began my study of law with Roman Law,
whose influence I have never escaped. Once I completed my English
education, with its heavy emphasis on the common law of contract,
property and torts, it inoculated me against some of the public law
excesses of American legal education in general, and the Yale Law
School in particular. Although I am often identified today with some
segment of the Chicago School of Law and Economics, that
understanding is somewhat incomplete. There is a sense in which the
institution that gets you first keeps you for the longest. And for law at
least, I remain part English in outlook, if not in accent, at least English
law as it was understood in the mid-1960s when I studied there.
This English influence will prove itself again in this brief article on
the role of vicarious liability and managed care organizations (MCOs)
which has been in the news so much today. As usual, I think that the
best way to cut into this problem is by indirection. The novelty of
liability for MCOs is best placed in perspective by comparing the claims
for liability here with those which could be made, both in England and
the United States, by employees against their employers for work-related
accidents.
We are fortunate today for the major reduction in the level of
workplace injuries, a shift that is attributable not only to our legal rules,
but also to the vast technological and industrial changes that have
reduced our dependence on the dangerous trades, such as mining and
railroading that loomed so large in the last half of the nineteenth century.
Yet our current lack of concern about the accident problem should not be
allowed to conceal the historical fact that liability for industrial
accidents-those which arose out of and in the course of employment-
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gave rise to a political debate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century that in its own way was as intense, if not more so, as the debate
over employment discrimination and sexual harassment has been in the
last part of the twentieth century. It seems fair to say that this issue
above all was the one that separated the defenders of laissez-faire from
their most insistent critics. It did so at a time when no progressive
reformer would even have mentioned the right to health care on a list
that included the traditional trinity of "food,. clothing, and shelter,"
which most people hoped they could afford from the take-home wages
for a grueling day's work.
That said, the response to industrial accidents forced our nineteenth
century forbearers into thinking about matters of institutional
responsibility, even though the vast bulk of earlier tort law had been
directed to questions of individual responsibility. Practically, the
familiar debates in the classical tort law had to do with the boundaries
between trespass and case as they applied to intersection collisions
between two horse-drawn carriages.
Theoretically, they revolved
around the place of blameworthiness in a general theory of tortious
responsibility. Representative of the older locus of concerns was,
ironically, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his classic The Common Law,
published in 1881.1 To be sure, as a famous realist he began with the
stirring and sonorous declaration: "The life of the law has not been logic:
it has been experience." 2 He immediately follows with his famous
observation about "the felt necessities of the time." 3 But it was all show:
within a page he was deep into the early forms of liability, on such topics
as the role of vengeance and the control of mayhem. Yet, nowhere in his
entire extended treatment of contract and tort does Holmes so much as
mention, let alone undertake, any assessment of the legal
transformations brought on by the rapid industrialization of the
nineteenth century. Industrial accidents, assumption of risk, the fellow
servant doctrine and vicarious liability make no appearance on his
pages.
Notwithstanding the backward, historical bias of writers such as
Holmes, the rise of large industrial corporations brought front-and-

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1881).
2 Id. at 1.
'

"The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political thories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men are governed." Id.
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center the question whether liability extended to the individual
workman who committed the wrong, or moved beyond him to reach the
firm that employed him. That question forced the courts to deal with the
tension between principles of vicarious liability and those of freedom of
contract in the workplace. The doctrine of vicarious liability in some
inchoate form was always a part of the common law, but it was typically
confined to actions of the servants that the master authorized. As
Blackstone put the matter, "As for those things which a servant may do
on behalf of his master, they seem all to proceed upon this principle, that
the master is answerable for the act of his servant, if done by his
command, either expressly given, or implied: nam qui facit per alium facit
4
per se" (he who acts through someone else acts for himself).
Yet, this formulation did not reach the key cases of accidental harms
that mark the rise of large, impersonal organizations. Explicit or implied
commands kept faith with the principle of personal blameworthiness,
but with industrialization, there were few explicit commands to commit
accidental wrongs, and only an artful interpretation of individual facts
could generate the implied command necessary to create liability. To fill
that gap, the principle of vicarious liability expanded so that it reached
5
all actions "arising out of and in the course of employment."
In truth, there was a fair bit of intellectual resistance to the idea of
holding the firm responsible for the transgressions of its workers.
Holmes himself pronounced the rule anomalous precisely because it
clashed with the bedrock principle of blameworthiness that limited each
person's responsibility to his or her own individual actions. 6 It was easy
to tie this principle of individual responsibility to traditional human
virtues of self-reliance and self-sufficiency. But it was, and is, somewhat
more difficult to see why one person, or why one group of shareholders,
should be held vicariously responsible for the actions of individual
workers.
These nagging academic and philosophical doubts, however, did not
prevent the legal system from responding powerfully to the changes in

4

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF ENGLAND 429 (1765).

For a

case taking this position, see Hem v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (Ex. 1708).
s See, e.g., Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., 158 Eng. Rep. 993 (Ex. 1862); River
Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, 2 A.C. 743 (H.L. (Eng.) 1876).
6 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891) ("1 assume that commonsense is opposed to making one man pay for another man's wrong unless he has actually
brought the wrong to pass.... I therefore assume that common-sense is opposed to the
fundamental theory of agency .. "). See also THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY (1916).
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the form of industrial organization. With a little invention courts were
prepared to apply the doctrine of vicarious liability to hold the firm
responsible to strangers and passengers who were injured by its
employees acting within the scope of their employment. The rationales
for this outcome were, and remain, frankly instrumental. 7 It was thought
inappropriate that innocent individuals should go without compensation
from the firms that stood to profit from the actions of its workers. It was
thought to be an invitation to bad conduct to allow the large industrial
complex to hide behind the insolvency of its workers who had inflicted
serious injuries on persons who were not part of the firm. It was thought
that liability on the firm would induce it to select careful workers, to
supply them with the right equipment, to assign them to the proper
tasks, and to monitor their behavior. It was thought that vicarious
liability would ease the need to police the merits of each of these firm
decisions, and thus help curb any temptation of the firm to delegate
dangerous tasks to untrained workers, by counting on their putative
insolvency to insulate the firm from tort liability. 8
The truth be told, we have not retreated one iota from these general
rationalizations for vicarious liability in the twentieth century because
these rationales seem to be, if anything, more robust today than they
were one hundred years ago. 9 The upshot of this position was that the
railroad was answerable to the passenger, the pedestrian and the
neighbor. They were not required to bring suit against the engineer or
conductor (assuming they could determine which of them had failed in
the mishap), but could hold the firm responsible without having to first
penetrate the layer of individual responsibility. The firm, of course, for
its part could turn around to sue the individual worker, assuming he
was solvent, for his own personal derelictions. But actions of this sort
were few and far between, although it seems likely that discipline or
dismissal did follow from individual misdeeds.
The remarkable
expansion of vicarious liability in these cases belies any effort to insist

7

For an early account, see Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L REv. 444

(1923).
8 Note that this tendency always is present, but is counteracted by other tendencies as
well. After all, the untrained or incompetent worker is just as likely to damage firm
equipment or hurt other employees, both of which consequences will redound to the
disadvantage of the firm. But in some contexts, the potential liabilities averted could justify
the incremental risks of exposure, so the point continues to be of concern even today,

especially in the delegation of certain dangerous tasks to other firms with more limited
resources.

9

See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984).
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that the judges, as members of the dominant social class, manipulated
legal rules to protect their industrial patrons.
By the same token, the law could not ignore the competing principle
of freedom of contract. That principle of course had no sway whatsoever
in those cases where railroads burned crops near the tracks, or injured
innocent bystanders. But freedom of contract could have been invoked
to limit the liability of the railroads to their passenger; indeed, after a
fashion it did, since the rules of common carrier liability would exempt
the railroad from harms attributable to Acts of God or violent acts of
third persons. But even here, there is normally little that any passenger
can do to learn of latent defects in the operation of railroads or take steps
to counter the dangers that he observes. The nineteenth century cases
thus took the position that the railroad was, in general, obliged to
observe "utmost care" in the preparation of its roadbeds, cars and
machinery; however, it was not held to the same high standard with
respect, for example, to the shoveling of snow along the stairs leading to
the train station, where the individual passenger has the means for selfprotection.10 In effect, there was probably little pressure for deviation
from the legal default rules in these cases. Contracting costs are high
with passengers that rapidly come and go on the lines; and public
disclaimers of liability were not the best way to attract business.
The situation with employees raised rather more substantial
contractual problems. In dealing with these workers, the firm recognizes
that the workers have large amounts of control over the equipment and
premises that they use, and thus can do much to cause or prevent
accidents in the workplace. In this setting, the principle of vicarious
liability cannot be justified as a means to protect strangers, even if it
could be invoked in order to expose the firm to liability for the wrongs
that one workman does to another.
At the same time, there were serious counterweights. Under the socalled "fellow servant" or "common employment" doctrines, the
common law courts erected a strong default presumption that the
10 See Kelley v. Metropolitan R.R., 20 N.E. 383, 385 (N.Y. 1889) (per Peckham, J.).
Ironically, some modem cases appear to at back on the liability of railroad company for
latent dangerous conditions by substituting the standard of ordinary care for that of utmost
care. See Bethel v. New York City Transit Auth., 703 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 1998). Yet other
cases keep the standard of "utmost care" in cases where passengers have better control
over the dangerous instrumentality, as in removing packages from overhead bins. See
Andrews v. United Airlines, 24 F.3d 39 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying summary judgment to
airline under California utmost care standard).
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worker was "deemed" to assume as against the firm the risk of injuries
arising out of the course of employment."
Even if we reject this artificial deener, there is another way to think
about this issue that will lead to the same conclusion in many cases.
Here the initial move is to note that the employer and his workers all
stand in direct relations with each other. The doctrine of freedom of
contract says that the employer could contract with all its employees to
either eliminate or cap that loss. In this setting, we do not have the
specter of imposing liability on strangers, for there seems good reason to
believe that no employee would give up the right to recover for accidents
in the event of injury unless he received, either in wages or collateral
benefits, something in exchange. Similarly, in this setting, we do not
have the situation where the firm might wish to contract out liability
because the worker, or his own gang or team, can do more to prevent
accidents than the firm itself. There is, moreover, likely to be some
variation in the ideal regime given the different patterns of firm
organization. We should not therefore treat it as a sign of industrial
recalcitrance that some employers eliminate the prospect of suit while
other employers continue to honor their common law liabilities.
The question here is whether the firm and worker can find some
system that works to minimize the expected losses for accidents. On that
issue we can take a leaf from our learned moderator, Guido Calabresi, to
ask whether the common law regime of negligence cum contributory
negligence minimized the sum of accident costs, the cost of their
prevention and the cost of administering the system. The movement
toward contracting out that was widely, but not universally, observed in
the mines and the rails suggest that the common law rules were
inefficient in at least some settings. For a risk averse worker, the
uncertainty in recovery was doubtless a serious disadvantage; both sides
would be unhappy about the high costs of litigation; and both parties
would ask whether negligence and contributory negligence subjected
both sides to the right incentives to take care.
Therefore, when we look to established practices in these firms, we
often find that they contracted out of tort liability. But it hardly followed
that there was any universal movement to adopt a defense of
assumption of risk by contract that afforded no compensation at all in

11 See Priestly v. Flower, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837). This carried over into American
law in Farwell v. Boston &'Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
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the event of injury. Rather, in many instances, we know as early as the
1860s and 1870s that workers and firms often contracted into a system
that on virtually all essential features adumbrated the workers'
compensation systems that were later introduced by statute, first in
England and then in the United States. 12 That result comports perfectly
well with a model that holds that one function of the law (whether we
call it torts or contracts does not matter too much for these purposes) is
to set default terms which the parties can contract around if they so
choose. It does not, however, comport well with the notion that waivers
of liability were always forms of exploitation that left workers worse off
than they would have been if they had never undertaken employment in
the first place. That view might well jibe with certain progressive
instincts on the subject, but it does explain the substitution of one liability
regime for another, especially one that offers, as the traditional
workmen's compensation bargain did, the quid pro quo of greater
coverage in exchange for smaller guaranteed payments. I conclude
therefore that in dealing with workplace injuries, the principle of
vicarious liability only sets up the prima facie case that holds the worker
responsible for the actions of another coworker. Yet, that is subject to a
defense based on assumption of risk or freedom of contract, where the
burden then shifts back to the worker to explain why the consent was
unfairly obtained.
Where there was union intervention (as was
frequently the case) or familiar terms that were widely accepted within
the industry, it is very difficult to overcome the presumption of
contractual regularity unless we choose to treat the worker as the ward
of the state.
Health Care.
The great question that faces us at the end of the twentieth century
does not concern industrial accidents, but medical accidents that arise
out of the provision of health care services. During the nineteenth
century there was little if any serious liability for medical malpractice. It
was yet another one of those subjects that nowhere appears in Holmes'
The Common Law. The explanation for the relative dearth of malpractice
cases probably lies in the prosaic truth that the level of medical error was
so high that it was almost pointless to distinguish between cases of
negligent and non-negligent error.13 It is only when the level of medical

12 Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Stncture of Workers'
Compensation, 16 GA. L. REv. 775 (1982).
13 See Mark Grady, Wlty Are People Negligent?: Technology, Nondurable Precautions,and the
Medical MalpracticeExplosion, 82 Nw. U. L REV. 293 (1988).
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care becomes sufficiently sophisticated that we can afford the luxury of
distinguishing between cases of medical negligence and those of simple
14
error, as the law routinely does today.
However, we have to face exactly the same question today that was
faced with industrial accidents over a century ago: Do we have a rule
that allows the physician and patient to contract out of the negligence
system, with or without the creation of any substitute system of
contractual liability? When that question was fought out in the context
of the liability of hospitals and individual physicians for tort liability, the
16
freedom of contract position lost' s for reasons that are not persuasive.
The dislocations of the tort system in the area of ordinary
malpractice actions are familiar enough. The costs of litigation are skyhigh since each disputed case calls forth legions of experts on both sides
of the line. The uncertainty in payouts place additional burdens on
individual patients and even on -large institutions that struggle to
balance their insurance portfolios. The error rates in adjudication tend to
dull the desirable incentive effects of the tort rules. And, the feedback
mechanism is most imprecise since the lag in litigation means that
individual defendants are held liable for technologies that have already
been displaced in the ordinary course of medical progress. Too often the
purpose of the system often seems to be to maximize (the sum of)
accident, prevention and administrative costs.
The problem of medical malpractice liability is less severe today than
it was 25 years ago. Here it is not so much the ad hoc reform legislation
that varies extensively state by state. Rather, much of the relief from
pressure comes from improved technology that reduces the rate of
failure in routine procedures (even if it may induce the undertaking of
newer procedures with higher error rates that become the topics of
litigation).
However, today, a new villain has appeared on the scene: the MCO.
The rise of the MCO is a long and complex story and this Article shall

11 See Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830 (Haw. 1998).
15 See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
16 See Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
87 (1976) [hereinafter Epstein, Medical Malpractice]. For similar views, see Glen 0.
Robinson, Rethinking tire Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks between Patients and Providers,
49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 172 (1986). For the opposite position, see Patrick Atiyah,
Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundanj, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287 (1986);
PAUL WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 113 (1991).
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give only the barest outlines of it.17 Health care (of which medical care is
the largest element) has two components. The first is routine care which
can be budgeted like rent, food or perhaps education. Current revenues
are sufficient to cover current costs, so that insurance is not worth the
administrative burden that it imposes. But health care also has a strong
probabilistic element. There is a small probability that even healthy
persons will suffer enormous losses with which neither accumulated
savings nor current earnings can cope. To fill that void, individuals
often seek to purchase health care insurance. But that strategy solves
one problem only to create a second. Physician and patient work
together to get the finest possible care at the expense of other
individuals. Ex ante, all members desire sensible coverage at affordable
prices. Ex post, the sky is the limit for a family member in dire straights.
So long as the expected benefit of treatment is perceived as positive, the
suffering patient does not care that its value is far below its expected cost
to others.
To offset the problem of excessive consumption of medical services,
we often ask our health care providers to ration services in order to
restore some balance between the financial and the human sides of the
program. The health plans have the unenviable task of acting as
gatekeepers. For a fee they are asked to say "no" to you in individual
cases, not because they hate you, though it seems as if they may, but
rather because everyone knows that unless they say no to you in the
individual case, the entire plan will unravel, first with one exception,
then with a second, and finally with a third. If anyone were to look at
the popular literature, MCOs have replaced insurance companies, banks,
and railroads, as the devils of the twentieth century. Mainly they
assume this role because they are the people who remind us that
resource scarcity pinches even in an age of apparent abundance, and
they do it in the worst of all possible situations -with expenditures that
are worth making in some sense, but not perhaps quite worth the costs
that they impose.
Now, it turns out through a whole variety of historical twists that the
HMOs and the MCOs have been insulated from tort liability. Part of this
odd development lays at the doorstep of ERISA, 18 whose preemption
provision has been widely interpreted to afford health plans total

17 For one account, see Richard A. Epstein, Managed Care Under Siege, 24 J. MED. & PHIL.
434 (1999).
18 Employment Retirement & Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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immunity against tort action for the negligent management of the health
plan's obligations toward its patients. 19 But can the barricades remain
stout when it is all too easy to turn against our gatekeepers and argue
that the treatments they deny, and the preconditions that they impose,
demean the patient in his or her greatest moment of need? Worse still,
the heavy hand of the health plan offers the individual physician or
hospital a ready excuse against any charge of medical negligence: we
would have done more if only that health plan had authorized
treatment.
At this point, frustrated patients have joined forces with frustrated
physicians to vent their collective spleen on MCOs. But in many cases
they appear to be thwarted by the preemption provisions. As a matter of
first principle, I can see no justification for the creation of a government
immunity from liability in a tort system. But as a practical matter, the
entire issue of ERISA preemption raises a rich irony, so long as it is
understood as a default contractual provision which could be waived by
the health plan if it so chose. Under that reading, ERISA may well
introduce, by weird coincidence, the efficient contractual solution to the
overall liability problem. The waivers are not forthcoming because it is
more efficient to channel tort -liability (if that is what it is) through direct
actions against' the physician or hospital than to bring in third parties
that are one degree removed from the actual treatment arena. It need
not be the case that this judgment proves right in all cases. It is sufficient
if it proves right in most cases when it is impossible to isolate out those
cases of serious abuse for which direct health plan liability might be
appropriate.
Yet, this solution has been under savage attack in litigation and in
the legislative arena. More concretely, the strong anti-market rhetoric
that characterized the attack on freedom of contract for workplace
injuries reasserts itself in identical form in the modem context.20 The
situation is regarded as exploitive and worse. Patients are thought to
have insufficient information to make intelligent choices as to treatment.
Their employers are said to care only about the cost of health care, and
not about the benefits that it provides workers. The call for a Patients'
Bill of Rights is heard around the realm. It matters not that the real Bill
of Rights imposed limitations on government powers while the
19 See Corcoran v. United Health Care, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
20 See Herdich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 374-75 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000)
("[Market forces alone] are insufficient to cure the deleterious [e]ffects of managed care on
the health care industry.").
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proposed legislation under that name seeks to increase the scope of
government power.
At present, it seems impossible to stop the steamroller and to
maintain the contractual system which, however flawed, may be better
than the alternatives that are proposed. Nonetheless, there are rejoinders
on the substantive challenges just raised. Employers have to recruit
workers, and good health plan coverage is a prerequisite that they can
offer. It is highly fanciful to think that employers are indifferent to the
health care offered to their employees. The absence of choice may be
imposed once the health care plan is selected, but it need hardly be the
case that employees have no voice in the selection of the health plan (or
plans) or in the modification, amendment or rejection.
Nor is it clear that the substantive provisions that are commonly
included in these Patients' Bill of Rights make sense. Broader coverage
for mental health or alcoholism could easily be of benefit to a tiny
fraction of workers but a net drain on the welfare of others. If so, then
imposing comprehensive coverage does more than supply coverage that
benefits workers and hurts firms (even if we put aside the wage and
premium adjustments that this entails): It could easily work a wealth
redistribution among workers that favors the less productive at the
expense of the more productive.
To mention just one other common proposal, it may well prove
unclear whether any additional levels of external review for the plans'
denial of treatment will improve the accuracy of the underlying
determinations. They might create a higher error rate at some additional
cost, or they could easily give rise to a serious adverse selection problem
in which a small set of desperate or troubled patients consume huge
amounts of resources that might be better used in treatment rather than
litigation.
In the alternative it could be said that an opportunity to be heard by
an outsider will help induce a higher level of care at the treatment level,
and increase the level of participant satisfaction in a program by
affording legitimate processes that help legitimate otherwise
controversial decisions. As a matter of first principle it would be very
odd to see any health plan (any more than any public welfare agency)
devote all of its resources to treatment and none of them to the delicate
art of customer relations and grievance procedures. But if those benefits
are true, then we should expect to see MCOs move to those needed
protocols voluntarily precisely because they will be able to internalize
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the gains from these actions. Many MCOs have decided to make further
efforts in this direction for just these reasons, at which point legislation
could hamper the overall effort to improve relations in the
plan/physician/patient triad by imposing requirements that do not meet
the needs of any particular program.
That said, we now have a concerted effort by lawyers to bring direct
actions (in tort of course) against health plan providers. In one recent
case, Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc.,21 a determined court
held that the handbooks and brochures of the health plan carried with
them the implied representation that physicians were in fact subject to
the control of the health plans so that the imposition of vicarious liability
was appropriate under the doctrines of apparent or implied authority.
The net effect was that the joint contractual understanding between
physicians and health plans that the latter were independent contractors
(to whom the doctrines of vicarious liability did not apply) were of no
effect, so that the older tort model of vicarious liability exposed the
health plan to, it appears, liability not only for its own errors and
omissions, but for any independent physician negligence.
Once again it is hard to predict the consequences of this new avenue
of liability. One possibility is that it will simply redirect toward MCOs
actions that would normally be brought against treating physicians and
their own hospitals and practice groups. But alternatively, it could
create a whole new dynamic in which patients and physicians settle their
grievances in ways that allow the physician to join forces with the
patient in attacking the health plan for its distant and hostile attitude to
the welfare of plan participants. "Send them a message" has long been
the stock war cry of able plaintiffs' lawyers, and it sounds better when
brought against a distant corporation than against the local physician or
hospital. Therefore, the change in the locus of litigation could do much
to expand the total bill for tort liability.
Unfortunately, if that is the case, then what goes around will come
around. We already know that many MCOs are on the financial ropes.
For each one that falters or fails, the slack will have to be picked up
elsewhere. Yet if all plans are hit by systematic pressures, then they
could easily fold or limit or reduce services if employers and their
workers find it unattractive to pay the outsized premiums needed to
fund this litigation in the first place. If that is the case we may not have

21 719 N.E.2d 756 (111. 1999).
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the same "happy landing" that we had in the workers' compensation
arena, when the state system proved relatively stable (at least until the
onset of occupational diseases such as asbestosis) precisely because it
borrowed so heavily from the private systems of workers' compensation
that were already in place. But whatever the final resting place for the
current legislative struggles, the conceptual issues have both similarities
and differences to the battle over industrial accidents that was waged
over one hundred years ago.
One final point is that it is doubtful that any system of medical nofault could work a tenth as well as the general workers' compensation
formula. The idea of tying liability to accidents that arise out of and in
the course of medical treatment is so broad and complex that the whole
system is likely to flounder on the inability to give any workable account
of what counts as a compensable event.22 So in the absence of that fix, it
seems clear that the most that we can do is impose ordinary standards of
reasonable care on the health plan, with all the ambiguity that this
entails.23
Therefore, in the end, it is more important to dwell on the structural
similarities between the older workers' compensation dispute and the
modem struggles over the liability of health plans for medical injuries.
So long as health plans, physicians, patients and employers have
contractual arrangements with each other, it is best to let these run their
course than to replace them with complicated legislative initiatives that
may have complex unintended consequences which only some new
scheme of legislation can correct.
The optimal contractual solution will look far different from the
proposed legislative initiative. The traditional immunities that the MCO
enjoys would (if allowed) probably remain in place, such that the
individual patient's only action would lie against the physicians and the
physician groups under traditional medical malpractice liability, unless
contractual relief were afforded there, as I , for example, urged nearly 25
years ago. 24 But there is little possibility that the pendulum will swing to

22 See Robert Keeton, Compensationfor Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1973). For
an effort to resurrect the no-fault ideal, see Paul Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical
Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908 (1993).
23 See, e.g., Managed Health Care Insurance Accountability Act of 1999, codified at CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3428(a) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 portion of 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. and 1st
Ex. Sess.).
24 See Epstein, Medical Malpractice,supranote 16.
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any contract solution in the short run. Therefore, it is feared that the
liability issue will careen out of control, which will in turn create greater
pressures for government operation of the entire system, at which point
the pendulum will switch once the government takes over power; it will
find all sorts of reasons why public funds should not be used to satisfy
the whims of runaway juries for jackpot justice. In short, the movement
toward legislative control over the liability system is only one part of a
long-term tendency, perhaps even a long-term plan, toward the
government takeover of the entire health care system -a subject large
and complex enough to enjoy a lecture of its own.

HeinOnline -- 34 Val. U. L. Rev. 594 1999-2000

